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ABSTRACT 
Let f be a multiple-valued Paretian social choice rule for 
n voters and an outcome set X. The preventing sets for f are shown to 
form an acyclic majority when \xi < n, a prefilter when lxl > n, and a 
filter when f also satisfies a binary independence condition. These 
results are then shown to yield inequalities relating IXI, n, and
certain preventing sets. In particular, if every coalition of q 
voters constititues a preventing set, then lxl 
� 
[n-l]. Other n-q 
inequalities are obtained if strong equilibria are present for every 
preference profile. 
POWER STRUCTURE AND CARDINALITY RESTRICTIONS FOR 
PARETIAN SOCIAL CHOICE RULES 
Edward W. Packel 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A fundamental result of Gibbard [4] and Satterthwaite [9] 
states that a single-valued social choice rule with dominant strategy 
equilibria for all preference profiles must be dictatorial. As the
hypotheses needed for this result are weakened, a variety of positive 
and negative results have emerged. Thus Peleg [8] and Dutta and 
Pattanaik [2] have shown that nondictatorial and even anonymous choice 
functions may be possible when strong equilibria replace dominant 
strategies. Packel and Saari [7] have shown, on the other hand, that 
weaker equilibrium conditions still tend to impose either highly 
indecisive or undemocratic power structures on the decisive sets of 
a single-valued social choice rule. 
In the present paper we consider (multiple-valued) social 
choice rules satisfying Pareto optimality, which we regard as the least 
controversial and weakest notion of cooperative equilibrium. We show 
that significant structural restrictions must exist on the preventing 
sets of a Paretian social choice rule. These restrictions lead to 
inequalities relating the cardinalities of the outcome set, the voter 
set, and certain preventing sets. More specifically, with m possible 
outcomes and n voters, the preventing sets of a Paretian social choice 
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rule are shown to form either a prefilter (if m � n) or an acyclic 
majority (if m < n). If every coalition of q voters constitutes a 
preventing set, it then follows that m � [
n-l], where [•] denotes then-q . 
greatest integer function. 
If a Paretian social choice rule is generated in a natural 
way by a prefilter of preventing sets, then a requirement that true 
preferences be strong equilibria places cardinality restrictions on 
the number of outcomes. This parallels, to some extent, ideas 
considered by Hurwicz and Schmeidler [5]. It also leads to a 
cardinality result for strong implementation of a class of quota games 
with a nonempty collegium. 
The simple example of the Pareto rule, which chooses for 
each preference profile the set of Pareto undominated outcomes, shows 
that dictatorship results analogous to those of Gibbard and Satterthwaite 
are not to be expected for multiple valued social choice rules. In 
addition to the cardinality restrictions obtained, the results we 
develop are noteworthy in that rather weak assumptions in a multiple-
valued setting still impose structure on the collection of coalitions 
that have power. 
II. NOTATION AND DEFINITIONS
We consider a finite set N of voters with INI = n. A set 
X of outcomes is under consideration by the voters, who must choose a 
nonempty subset from X. 
Let R denote the set of reflexive, transitive, total orderings 
(weak orders) on X. If Ri E R denotes the preference ordering over
X for voter i, let 
n = (�,R2, . . . ,Rn) E Rn
denote the corresponding profile of preferences. Conversely, if 
n E Rn is a profile, R. will always denote the ith component of n andl. 
Pi will denote the asymmetric part (xP iy <� - yRix) of Ri. Likewise,
7f E Rn has i th component R ..l. 
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A social choice rule is a function f : Rn ->- 2X - {cjl}, where
2 X denotes the collection of subsets of X. Thus, for each n E Rn,
f(n) is a nonempty subset of X representing the social choice of the 
voters under the preference profile n. 
f 
The preventing sets Pf for a social choice rule
Rn ->- 2X - {cp} are defined by
p
f {Cc NIV n E R
n, Vx,y EX, xP.Y Vi EC� y t f(n)}.- l. 
It is easy to see that members of a preventing set have power in the 
sense that any profile n such that xPiy Vl E C, Vy Ix requires that
f (n) = {x}. 
A social choice rule f is Paretian if x Piy Vi E N� y t f(n).
It is clear that f is Paretian if and only if N E Pf.
Collections of preventing sets will be shown to satisfy various 
various set-theoretic properties. We now define the relevant power 
structures proceeding from most flexible to least democratic. 
An acyclic majority is a collection S of subsets of N 
satisfying the following properties: 
(I) cjl t S; N E S
(II) C E S and C C D � D E S 
(III.AM) Ci ES Vi E I and III � lxl � n iEI 
c. I cp. l. 
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The condition IIIAM becomes increasingly restrictive as the set X of 
alternatives grows. The cardinality condition jij � jxj will be shown
to be relevant only when jxj < jNJ. With jxj = 3 such democratic
(anonymous) voting methods as three-fourths rule ( jN j = 4) and
five-sevenths rule (jNj = 7) give rise to acyclic majorities. 
A prefilter is a collection S � 2N satisfying I, II, and
(II�F) Ci E S'Vi E I� _
n
I 
Ci 'f ¢. l. E  
The nonempty set n C in a prefilter is called the collegium. 
cE.S 
collection of preventing sets forms a prefilter, its collegium 
If a 
generally needs outside support (enough to become a preventing set) 
to effect its collective will. A choice rule with a prefilter 
structure is called a collegial polity. 
A filter is a coll�ction S c 2N satisfying I, II, and
(III) C, D E S � C n D E S. 
In a filter on a finite set N, the collegium is the smallest preventing 
set. This set can be regarded as an oligarchy which controls the 
choice rule. It is immediate from the definitions that 
S a filter � S a prefilter � S an acyclic majority. 
III. RESULTS AND PROOFS
The first theorem extends a result from [7] to (multiple­
valued) social choice rules. 
Theorem 1. Let f 
Then 
Rn + 2X - {¢} be a Paretian social choice rule.
(a) Jxj < n � Pf is an acyclic majority
(b) Jxj � n � Pf is a prefilter
Proof. Properties I and II for acyclic majorities and prefilters 
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follow directly from the Paretian assumption and the definition of Pf.
Properties IIIAM and IIIPF will emerge from the following argument.
k 
Given c1,c2, ... ,Ck E Pf, suppose _
n C. = ¢. For (a) we may also
J=l J 
assume k � jxj. For (b) there is no loss of generality in assuming
k � n (for each i E N take one C. that excludes i and the resultant
J 
sets C. will for a collection of size not exceeding n). Since for (b)
J 
n � Jxj, we may again assume k � Jxj, just as for (a). It is then
possible to choose distinct x1,x2, . • .  ,� EX and a profile TI E  Rn such
that everyone has x1,x2, • • •  ,� among their top k choices and
Note that transitivity 
k 
supposition that n C. 
j=l J 
must have x. E f(TI) for
J 
xlix2 'Ji E Cl
xlix3 'Ji E C2
x. 1P.x. 'Vi EC.J- l. J J
�Pixl 'Vi E Ck.
of preferences in TI is possible by our 
¢· Since f is Paretian and f(TI) 1' ¢, we 
some j 1,2, • • •  ,k. Since Cj-l (or Ck if j=l)
belongs to Pf, we also have x. t f(TI). This contradicts the supposition
k . J 
that n c. = ¢ and establishes the theorem. I I 
j=l J 
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Theorem 1 has direct implications concerning the decisiveness 
and concentration of power for a Paretian social choice rule. Given an 
integer q with n/2 < q < n, we call f g-preventing if
c ,=. N and lei � q � c E Pf. 
If lxl � n, the prefilter that results from Theorem 1 implies that a 
Paretian social choice rule f can never be q-preventing. In this case 
f can only be "democratic" or anonymous when Pf= 
{N}, in which case
f may be highly indecisive. If lxl < n, anonymous power structures
are possible, but only when the size of X is restricted according 
to the following theorem. 
Theorem 2. Given f Rn + ii- - {¢} Paretian and q-preventing. 
Then lxl ::: [n-11 n-q . 
Proof. It is always possible to choose [n-ll + 1 subsets of N ofn-q 
size n-q whose union is all of N. Choose a specific collection of 
k = [�=�] + 1 such sets and call them B1,B2, • . .  ,Bk. Since f is
q-preventing, C. = N - B. E Pf Vj = 1,2, • • .  ,k. J J 
Also 
k k 
j�l Bj = N � jQl Cj = ¢. Since Pf is an acyclic majority by Theorem 1, 
I I n-1 it follows that X < k = [ ] + 1. n-q Thus !xi :::: [
n-1). 11 n-q 
An inequality equivalent to that of Theorem 2 is obtained 
by Peleg [81. His result assumes that f is single-valued and strongly 
consistent. Since our result merely requires Pareto optimality rather 
than strong equilibria for each profile, it would appear to be more 
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general. On the other hand, Peleg assumes q-winning sets rather than 
the stronger assumption of q-preventing, so the two results are not 
strictly comparable. 
A result giving Pf a filter structure can also be extended
from [7] to our setting. Define a social choice rule f : Rn + 2X - {¢} 
to be binary independent if VTI,TI' E Rn, Vx, y E X 
[x E f (TI), y i f (TI), xP.y<zi> xP�y and yP.x� yP�x Vi E l'fl =$ y i f (TI').1 1 1 1 
Binary independence is a natural version of the well-known independence 
of irrelevant alternatives applied to our social choice setting. It 
says that if two profiles are identical in their pairwise rankings of 
x and y, then one profile cannot result in the selection of y while 
the other chooses x and excludes y. 
Theorem 3.  Let f : Rn+ 2X - {¢} be a Paretian, binary independent 
social choice rule with lxl � 3 .  Then Pf is  a filter. 
Proof. Given C, DE Pf we must show t
hat C n DE Pf. Suppose some 
TIE Rn has xP.y Vi E c n D. Choose if E Rn with x, y, and z (all distinct) 1 
ranked among the top three alternatives for all voters in such a 
way that: 
xPiz Piy Vi E C n D 
xP.z and P. agrees with P. on {x, y} Vi E C-D 1 1 1 
zP.y and P. agrees with P. on {x,y} Vi E C-D 1 1 1 
P. agrees with P. on {x,y} Vi E N-(C U D). 1 1 
Then CE Pf� z ¢ f (TI) and DE Pf� y ¢ f (TI). Since f is Paretian 
and all other outcomes are ranked below x, y, and z by TI, we have 
{x} = f (TI). Since TI and TI agree on {x, y} by construction, binary
independence implies that y t f (TI). Hence C n D prevents y and is 
thus a preventing set. I I 
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It is easy to check that the mapping f I+ Pf from Paretian 
social choice rules to collections of preventing sets is not one-to-one. 
Going in the other direction, we can define a social choice rule in 
a natural way from a prefilter P of subsets of N. Given P, define 
f
p 
: Rn + zX - {¢} as follows: 
x E fp (TI) <=> Ve E P, Vy E X, 3i E c 3 xRiy. 
Thus x E fp (TI) precisely when no coalition in P prevents it. 
We now wish to assume a form of strong stability on a social 
choice rule f : Rn + zX - {¢}. To do this in our multiple-valued 
setting, we need to extend a weak preference order P on X to a weak 
order ; on zX - {¢}. There are a variety of ways in which this 
extension might be made, but the results we obtain require only that 
the extension procedure satisfy the following reasonable axiom: 
( � ) Vx,y E X, xPy <=> {x,y }P{y}. 
We assume this property of set-preference extensions for the duration. 
Given a procedure which extends preferences P on X to 
preferences P on zX - {¢} , we say that TIE Rn is a strong equilibrium 
for f : Rn + zX - {¢} if 
n -
VTI E R , V nonempty C 5_ N, 3i E C 3 f (TI)Ri f (nC, TIN-C) 
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(the profile (iTC, TIN-C) takes preferences from 
TI for i E C  and TI for i E N-C). 
We call f : Rn + zX - {¢} strongly straightforward if every 
TIE Rn is a strong equilibrium for f. This equilibrium notion from 
game theory requires that no coalition can improve the outcome for all 
its members by misrepresenting their preferences. 
The presence of strong equilibria for all profiles is used in 
Ferejohn and Grether [3] to obtain a result that ties in neatly with 
Theorem 1. Generalizing preferences to abstract strategies, we let 
g : Sn + X be a game form mapping strategy profiles into single outcomes. 
Let Eg(TI) denote the set of strong equilibria for profile TI, and assume 
for all TI E Rn that Eg(TI) � ¢. Define the decisive sets Cg for g by
Cg = {c � Nj Vx E X 3 sx E Sn s.t. g (s�, sN-C) = x Vs E S
n} . 
Ferej ohn and Grether prove that Cg must be a prefilter when jxj � n. 
Call f : Rn + 2
X 
- {¢} strongly and fully implementable by g if 
f (TI) = g (Eg(TI)) VTI E R
n. 
It is easy to show that f is strongly and fully implemented by g, then 
Cg = Pf. Thus our Theorem 1 provides an alternative proof that the 
decisive sets of a strongly and fully implementing game form must be a 
prefilter when jxj � n. Theorem 1 also provides a new and analogous 
result for acyclic majorities when lxl < n. 
The following theorem and its corollary yield restrictions 
on the size of the outcome set for strongly straightforward social 
choice rules arising from proper prefilters (prefilters that are not 
filters). 
Theorem 4. Given a social choice rule fp defined from a proper 
prefilter on N. Let C = npc. be the collegium of p and let 
CiE · l. k 
{Dj}j=l be a nonempty collection of subsets of N-C such that
(i) CUD. E P \Jj = 1,2, • • .  ,k J 
k 
(ii) jQl Dj = cp.
Then fp strongly straightforward � Jxl � k.
Proof. First note that since P is a proper prefilter, nonempty 
collections {D. } with the desired properties must exist. We can
J 
k 
assume, without loss of generality, that {D. }. 1 has no properJ J= 
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subcollections satisfying (ii) and that, for each D., no proper subset
J 
of D. satisfies (i). Suppose that Jxl > k. Then we can choose
J 
k + 1 distinct outcomes x1,x2,x3, • • •  ,�, and z EX and a profile
TI E Rn ranking these outcomes above all others and satisfying:
\J. EC, l. 
\Ji E Dl,
\Ji E D2,
\Ji E D3'
zPixlPix2 • • .  Pixk
zPix1,
xlix2
x2Pix3
\Ji E Dk-1' �-2Pixk-l
\Ji E Dk, xk-l
p
i�Piz.
(Failure to specify a preference between outcomes on a set D. means
J 
there is no unanimity on D. or on any other set whose union with C
J 
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belongs to P). Since CUD. E P it follows that x. i fp(TI) \Jj = 1,2, . • •  ,k
J J 
and hence that fp(TI) = { cjJ}. Consider the profile 1T which is identical 
to TI except that 
\Ji E Dk, �Pixk-lPiz.
The definition of fp now requires that f(TI) = {�,z}. Since
xkPiz \Ji E Dk, it follows that {xk,z} 
P
i {z} \Ji E Dk. Thus all members
of Dk are better off misrepresenting TI with 1T and strong straightfowardness
is violated. It follows that we cannot have Jxl > k. I I 
We now apply Theorem 4 to a prefilter PC defined by a,q,n 
collegium C with lei = c < n-1 and a quota q (n>q>c) so that
B E p<O=O> C .=_Band JBJ � q. 
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We denote the social choice rule arising from such a pref ilter by 
f . C,q,n 
Corollary. If the social choice rule fC ,q,n R
n + 2X - {¢} is strongly 
straightforward, then !xi n-c-1] + 1. !:: [ n-q 
Proof. n-c-1 It is always possible to choose [��-] + 1 subsets of N-Cn-q 
of size n-q whose union is all of N-C. Choose a specific collection 
n-c-1 of k = [ n-q ],+ 1 such sets and call them �,A2, ... ,�. Then the
k 
collection {D.}. 1 defined by D. = N - (C U A.) satisfies conditions J J= J J 
(i) and (ii) of Theorem 4 for the proper prefilter PC • If fc . ,q,n ,q,n 
is strongly straightforward, it follows that !xi !:: k = [n-c-l] + 1. I I n-q 
Theorem 4 and its corollary show that strong straightforwardness 
imposes severe restrictions on the size of the outcome set for social 
choice rules defined from prefilters. It should be noted that any social 
choice rule defined from a filter must satisfy strong straightforwardness 
for reasonable set-preference extensions. A converse to the corollary 
along these lines would be an interesting result. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Since our concern here has been with social choice rules 
which are multiple-valued, the issue of implementation via a mechanism 
or game form (see [1,6]) might seem relevant. The unanimity aspect 
of Pareto optimality as an equilibrium concept, however, makes questions 
of implementation uninteresting in this setting. Our use of strong 
equilibria in Theorem 4 does admit the possibility of meaningful 
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consideration of implementation via indirect mechanisms as opposed to 
the true-preference setting we have employed. The restrictions we 
have obtained on !xi may not exist with the use of strongly stable 
indirect mechanisms. 
While there exist difficulties with interpreting Pareto 
optimality as an equilibrium concept, especially in noncooperative 
game theory, it does provide parallels with results for or.her equilibrh.-,o 
concepts (see [7]). Whether or not this interpretation is employed, t.he 
normative acceptability and widespread existence of Paretian social 
choice rules give our results a degree of generality not present 
with more restrictive equilibrium conditions. 
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